A handful of well-known arguments (the 'diachronic Dutch book arguments') rely upon theorems purporting to establish that you are immune from diachronic Dutch book-ability if and only if you adopt the strategy of conditionalizing (or Jeffrey conditionalizing) on whatever evidence you happen to receive. These theorems require nontrivial assumptions about which evidence you might acquire-in the case of conditionalization, the assumption is that, if you might learn that e, then it's not the case that you might learn something else that is consistent with e. These assumptions may not be relaxed. When they are, not only will non-(Jeffrey) conditionalizers fail to be diachronically Dutch book-able, but (Jeffrey) conditionalizers will themselves be diachronically Dutch book-able. I argue that either there are epistemic situations in which these assumptions break down, and (Jeffrey) conditionalization is diachronically Dutch book-able, or else many (and plausibly most) learning experiences fall outside of the purview of the diachronic Dutch book arguments. Either way, these arguments are invalid.
1 Introduction T he belief-revision norm conditionalization says that, when experience rationalizes absolute certainty that e, and nothing stronger, you ought to adopt a posterior credence function, C e ( · ), which is your prior credence function conditionalized on e, C( · | e). 1 condi. If experience rationalizes absolute certainty that e, and nothing stronger, 2 C e ( · ) ! = C( · | e) Many have thought that experience can carry information without rationalizing absolute certainty about any proposition. In that case, condi does not apply. Jeffrey (1965) , therefore, provides a generalization of that norm, known as Jeffrey conditionalization. This belief revision norm applies when experience rationalizes shifting your credence in each cell e i of a partition E to a new posterior credence ε i . 3 We can represent this kind of evidence with a set of ordered pairs E = {⟨e 1 , ε 1 ⟩, . . . , ⟨e N , ε N ⟩}, 4 and we can call evidence like this a Jeffrey shift. Jeffrey conditionalization says that, when you undergo a Jeffrey shift E, then you should adopt a posterior credence function C E ( · ) which is equal to ∑ i C( · | e i ) · ε i . jcondi. If experience rationalizes credence ε i in e i , for every e i in a partition E, and nothing else,
There is a popular way of justifying condi and jcondi which appeals to the fact that, roughly, failure to follow the dictates of either condi or jcondi will lead you into diachronic practical irrationality. 5 More carefully, when you stand to learn that one of a partition of propositions is true, if you plan to revise your degrees-of-belief in any way other than the way that condi tells you to, then a clever bookie could concoct a strategy which exposes you to the risk of losing money with no hope of winning any money (i.e., you are 'diachronically Dutch book-able'). 6 And, when you stand to undergo a 2 A word on notation: throughout, I'll place an exclamation mark '!' over an equality or inequality to indicate that the (in)equality has normative, and not descriptive, force. That is: the claim is not that C e ( · ) will be C( · | e), but rather merely that it should be. 3 A partition E of the agent's credal state is a set of subsets of those worlds which they take to be possible such that each member of the set is disjoint from every other member of the set, and the members of the set are jointly exhaustive-there are no worlds left out. 4 In adopting this representation of the evidence, I don't mean to imply that the values ε i are determined by the experience alone; it could rather be that the experience, along with the agent's prior credence function, determines the values ε i . See Field (1978) . 5 See Teller (1976) , Lewis (1999) , Skyrms (1987) , Armendt (1980) , and §2. 6 Throughout, I'm going to focus on what Hájek (2008) calls semi-Dutch books-i.e., Dutch books which at best break even and at worst lose money. This is entirely for ease of presentation; Dutch books which lose money in every contingency are available for both condi (in Teller, 1976) and jcondi (in undiscussed sections of both Armendt, 1980 and Skyrms, 1987) .
Jeffrey shift on some particular partition, if you plan to revise your degreesof-belief in any way other than the way that jcondi tells you to, then you are diachronically Dutch book-able. Many have objected to these diachronic Dutch book arguments ('ddbas') for condi and jcondi on the grounds that they offer a merely pragmatic, rather than an epistemic, reason to revise your degrees-of-belief in accordance with condi or jcondi; and/or that diachronic pragmatic inconsistency need not be a symptom of any underlying epistemic inconsistency. 7 Put these objections aside. There is a deeper problem with using a ddba to justify an update rule like condi or jcondi. As I will explain in further depth below, in order to concoct a diachronic Dutch book strategy, you must know ahead of time which possible learning experiences an agent might undergowhich propositions they might learn, or which Jeffrey shifts they might undergo. The ddba for condi assumes that the potential evidence an agent might acquire form a partition; and the ddba for jcondi assumes that the potential Jeffrey shifts are all shifts on the very same partition. These assumptions may not be relaxed. If we allow the potential evidence propositions to overlap, 8 then not only will some non-conditionalizers fail to be diachronically Dutch book-able, but conditionalizers will themselves be diachronically Dutch book-able ( §2.2). And if we allow the potential Jeffrey shifts to occur on cross-cutting partitions, not only will some non-Jeffrey conditionalizers fail to be diachronically Dutch book-able, but Jeffrey conditionalizers will themselves be diachronically Dutch book-able ( §2.4).
In general, whether an agent is diachronically Dutch book-able depends not merely on the learning experience they actually underwent, but additionally upon what they other learning experiences they might have undergone instead. Therefore, on the assumption that learning scenarios in which an agent might acquire one of two consistent propositions are possible, the ddba presupposes a contrastivist theory of evidential import, according to which the rational response to a learning experience depends not just upon your prior credal state and the acquired evidence, but additionally upon which other evidence might have been acquired instead. Condi and jcondi, on the other hand, are not sensitive to which other learning experiences the agent might have undergone. Condi and jcondi are only sensitive to the learning experiences that the agent did undergo. They presuppose a noncontrastivist theory of evidential import, according to which the rational response to a learning experience depends upon your prior credal state and the acquired evidence alone. For this reason, ddbas are invalid. Exposure to diachronic Dutch 7 Christensen (1991) 8 Throughout, I will say that the propositions p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p N overlap just in case ∩ i p i ∅.
books cannot be used to vindicate either condi or jcondi so long as those rules are understood in the usual way: as prescribing rational belief change as a function of your prior credal state and the acquired evidence alone. We must therefore either abandon ddbas or else emend our understanding of condi and jcondi.
Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments
The diachronic Dutch book arguments for condi and jcondi presuppose that at least one part of an agent's doxastic state-what we can call their credal state-is representable as a quadruple ⟨W, A, C, C⟩ of a set of worlds, W, a set of what I will call propositions (sets of worlds) A ⊆ ℘(W), a set of absolute certainties C ⊂ A, and a credence function, C, from the members of A to the unit interval [0, 1] . W contains all the worlds which the agent takes to be possible. A is known as the agent's algebra. It contains all those propositions about which the agent has credal opinions-those propositions over which the agent's credence function is defined. It is standardly supposed that A ought to be a sigma-algebra-that is, an algebra which contains W and is closed under countable union and complementation. 9 C contains all of those propositions about which the agent is absolutely certain. The credence function C represents how confident the agent is in each proposition p ∈ A. If C(p) = 0, then the agent is certain that p is false; 10 if C(p) = 1, then the agent is certain that p is true. If C(p) = 0.5, then they think that p is just as likely to be true as false. Because, for every e ∈ C, the agent is rationally certain that e, for every e ∈ C, C(e) ought to be 1. 11 For the purposes of this paper, I'll assume that, at any given time, an agent's credal state ought to satisfy the axioms of probability. How should an agent's credal state evolve over time? A standard assumption-for some, a simplifying assumption, for others, 12 a substantive theoretical commitmentis that evidence comes in the form of propositions about which the learning experience rationalizes absolute certainty. It is also standardly supposed- . 10 Note that, just because C(p) = 0, this doesn't necessarily mean that the agent regards p as epistemically impossible. If I'm going to randomly pick a real number from the unit interval [0, 1], I assign credence 0 to picking π/4, but I still think that it's possible that I pick π/4. I used to think that cases like these call for infinitesimal credences, but Williamson (2007) , Easwaran (2014) , and Hájek (ms) have persuaded me otherwise. 11 Though the converse does not hold. C allows us to distinguish propositions which are merely given credence one from those that are epistemically necessary (I'm calling the later, and not the former, 'absolute certainties')-see fn 10. 12 For instance, Lewis (1999 Lewis ( , 1996 . though perhaps only as a simplifying assumption-that W remains fixed over time, that no propositions are ever added to or subtracted from A, and that propositions are only ever added to C, and never taken out. The agent never recognizes any new possibilities, they never start being opinionated about any new propositions, nor stop being opinionated about any old propositions, and they never lose any absolute certainties. 13 Given these stipulations, condi says that, if e is the strongest proposition about which experience rationalizes absolute certainty, then you ought to transition from the prior credal state ⟨W, A, C, C⟩ to the posterior credal state ⟨W, A, C ∪ {e}, C e ⟩, where
Let's say that, when the sole effect of a learning experience is to rationalize absolute certainty about a proposition, you have acquired propositional evidence. Evidence may come in different forms. For instance, Jeffrey (1965) believed that experience could have the result of shifting your credence across the cells of some partition without rationalizing absolute certainty about any particular proposition-what I called earlier a Jeffrey shift. Jcondi says that, if you undergo a Jeffrey shift rationalizing posterior credences of ε i in the cells e i of a partition E, then you ought to transition from the prior credal state ⟨W, A, C, C⟩ to the posterior credal state ⟨W, A, C, C E ⟩, where
the ddba for condi
In order to construct a ddba for or against any belief-updating rule, we must specify not merely which proposition some hypothetical agent actually learns, but also which other propositions they could have learned instead. To show that an agent conforming to an update rule is diachronically Dutch book-able in any objectionable sense, it is not enough to show that that agent could be sold a series of bets, the combination of which is guaranteed to lose money, no matter what. Even a perfectly rational agent could have a credence of 0.6 in p-and therefore buy a dollar bet on p for $0.6 14 -and later acquire evidence the effect of which is to change their credence in p to 0.4. They could at that point buy a dollar bet on ¬p for $0.6. Such an agent will have purchased a combination of bets which is guaranteed to lose $0.2 no matter what. This does not show that you ought never change your credence in any 13 See Titelbaum (2013) for a generalization of condi which allows propositions to be taken out of C. 14 For the sake of simplicity, I'll be supposing throughout that the agents under consideration have utility functions which are linear in dollars, are not risk averse, that the truth of the proposition being bet upon does not depend upon whether the agent takes the bet, and so on and so forth.
Figure 1: The learning scenario presupposed by Lewis's diachronic Dutch book strategy. The agent will either become certain that e 1 is true, and therefore that e 2 through e N are false, or that e 2 is true, and therefore that e 1 , e 3 , . . . , e N are false, or that . . . or that e N is true, and therefore that e 1 . . . e N−1 are false.
proposition from 0.6 to 0.4, no matter what evidence comes in. Even though this agent has purchased a series of bets which is guaranteed to lose money come what may, it needn't be the case that this could have been predicted ahead of time by a bookie who knew no more than the agent that they would end up purchasing the second bet. It could be that the agent might have acquired evidence that raised, rather than lowered, their credence that p. If they had acquired this evidence, then they would not have purchased the second bet, and they would not have bought into a sure loss. What a ddba requires is a strategy which will in some contingencies lead to the agent losing money and in no contingencies lead to the agent winning any money. And a strategy like this requires a specification of which propositions the agent might end up learning.
I'll call such a specification a learning scenario, S, and I'll model a learning scenario with a set of propositions {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e N }. In order to be in this learning scenario, it must be possible that your total evidence will be e 1 , it must be possible that your total evidence will be e 2 , . . . , it must be epistemically possible that your total evidence will be e N , and it must be epistemically necessary that your total evidence will be exactly one of the e i ∈ {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e N }. I say that it must be epistemically possible that your total evidence be e i . What sort of modality is in play here? Is the claim that you don't know that you won't acquire total evidence e i ? Is it that there's some w ∈ W at which you acquire total evidence e i ? It is that you assign non-zero credence to the proposition that you acquire total evidence e i ? The proponent of the ddba for condi ought to say something about this, though little has actually been said. I suspect that the best thing to say is that ϕ is necessary iff ϕ is true at all possibilities in W, but I don't believe that anything I have to say here hinges upon this question. Lewis (1999) 's ddba for conditionalization presupposes that an agent finds themselves in a learning scenario S which forms a partition of W. In a learning scenario like this, if the agent conforms to a determinate beliefrevision norm 15 which tells them to set their posterior credence that p (for any proposition p) to C e i (p) > C(p | e i ), for any of the e i ∈ S, then they could be sold bet 1 prior to undergoing the learning experience. (The dollar amount on the left is the agent's net gain from the bet if the proposition to the right turns out to be true.)
Then, if the agent doesn't learn e i , they will learn one of the other propositions in S, which entails that ¬e i , so they will break even on bet 1. If, on the other hand, they learn that e i , then they can be sold bet 2.
Given that e i is true, the combination of bets 1 and 2 is guaranteed to lose the agent $C(p | e i ) − C e i (p). The agent has therefore opened themselves up to the risk of losing money without any hope of winning money. If, on the other hand, the agent conforms to a determinate belief-revision norm which tells them to set their posterior credence that p to C e i (p) < C(p | e i ) for any proposition p and any e i ∈ S, then they will sell bet 1 to you prior to learning anything. If they don't learn that e i , then they will break even with bet 1. If they learn that e i , then they will sell bet 2 to you. At that point, the agent will have bought into a guaranteed loss of $C e i (p) − C(p | e i ). Their belief-revision rule will then have opened them up to the possibility of losing money without any chance of winning money.
So, if an agent in a learning scenario S which forms a partition has a determinate update rule which tells them to set their posterior credence in 15 A belief-revision norm is determinate iff it tells you to adopt some particular posterior doxastic state after learning that e is true (for any e), or after undergoing any Jeffrey shift. Rules which tell you to pick a doxastic state at random, willy-nilly, upon learning that e (for some e), or undergoing some Jeffrey shift, will not be diachronically Dutch book-able in these learning scenarios. Nor will rules which give you a wide enough range of permissible posterior doxastic states to choose from.
any proposition p to anything other than C(p | e i ) when they learn that e i , for any of the e i ∈ S, then they are diachronically Dutch book-able. Skyrms (1987) shows that the converse is true as well; an agent who updates their degrees of belief in accordance with condi is not diachronically Dutch book-able in this kind of learning scenario. The ddba for condi proceeds as follows.
1. Any determinate rule for updating your degrees of belief in response to propositional evidence other than condi is diachronically Dutch book-able in a learning scenario which forms a partition.
2. Updating your degrees of belief with condi in response to propositional evidence is not diachronically Dutch book-able in a learning scenario which forms a partition.
3. Ideally epistemically rational agents update their degrees of beliefs in accordance with determinate update rules. 16 4. Ideally epistemically rational agents are not diachronically Dutch bookable.
5. So, ideally epistemically rational agents always update their degrees of beliefs in accordance with condi in response to propositional evidence.
I don't believe it misrepresents the proponents of ddbas to say that it is (5), and not the weaker (6) which is standardly presented as the conclusion of their argument.
6. So, in learning scenarios which form a partition, ideally epistemically rational agents always update their degrees of beliefs in accordance with condi in response to propositional evidence.
However, (5) does not follow from (1-4); only (6) does. If we had an extra premise to the effect that ideally epistemically rational agents only acquire propositional evidence in learning scenarios which form a partition, then (5) would follow. However, if i) it possible to acquire propositional evidence outside of any learning scenario, or ii) it is possible to acquire propositional evidence in a learning scenario which is not a partition, then the ddba for condi would not establish that ideally rational agents update by conditionalization in those cases. 
the ddba against condi
Moreover, if it is possible to acquire evidence in a learning scenario, some of whose members overlap in a particular way, then, not only does it not follow that any rule other than condi is diachronically Dutch book-able. It follows that condi itself is diachronically Dutch book-able. 17
Consider an agent who finds themselves in the learning scenario shown in figure 2. That agent might learn that e 1 (and nothing stronger), they might learn that e 2 (and nothing stronger), it is guaranteed that they will learn exactly one of these, and e 1 and e 2 overlap. Suppose that this agent learns that e 1 . If they were to conditionalize on e 1 , then their credence that e 1 ∧ e 2 would go up. So long as 0 < C(e 1 ) < 1, C(e 1 ∧ e 2 | e 1 ) > C(e 1 ∧ e 2 ). Similarly, if they were to conditionalize on e 2 , their credence that e 1 ∧ e 2 would go up. So long as 0 < C(e 2 ) < 1, C(e 1 ∧ e 2 | e 2 ) > C(e 1 ∧ e 2 ). So, no matter what evidence the agent acquires, if they conditionalize on that evidence, their credence that e 1 ∧ e 2 will go up. This means that, prior to the 17 Hild (1998b,a) argues that condi only applies in special cases in which the agent has degrees of belief about, and perfect introspective access to, their own epistemic state (which forces their learning scenario to form a partition). In other cases, he contends that condi will not apply. He argues for this by considering a variant of the three prisoner paradox (see Gardner, 1961) in which the prisoner learns that one of the other prisoners will be killed, but does not learn that they have learned this; in this scenario, Hild contends that conditionalization will be diachronically Dutch book-able. (Hild actually discusses 'Freund's Puzzle', but, best I can tell, this problem is equivalent to the three prisoner problem, which appears to be far better known.) Pearl (1988, p. 60 ) reaches a similar conclusion: "The lesson of the three prisoner paradox is that we cannot assess the impact of new information by considering only propositions implied by the information. We must also consider what information could have been reported". See also Bronfman (forthcoming) for related discussion.
learning experience, they will accept bet 3.
And, after the learning experience, if they learn that e i , then they will accept bet 4.
The agent's net gain from bets 3 and 4 will be $C(e 1 ∧ e 2 ) − C(e 1 ∧ e 2 | e i ) no matter what. Since C(e 1 ∧ e 2 | e i ) > C(e 1 ∧ e 2 ), for i = 1, 2, this means that an agent who conditionalizes on their evidence will be diachronically Dutch book-able in this learning scenario.
This diachronic Dutch book strategy may be generalized somewhat. Consider a learning scenario in which some of the potential evidence propositions overlap-that is, consider a learning scenario S = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e N } such that, for some {e * 1 . . . e * N } ⊆ S,
∅, and ii) for any e j ∈ S − S * , e j ∩ ∩ i e * i = ∅. And say that a maximal overlapping subset of S has breathing room iff, conditional on at least one of the e * i ∈ S * being true and all of the e j ∈ S − S * being false, the agent is neither certain that all of the e * i ∈ S * are true, nor certain that not all of the e * i ∈ S * are true,
In any learning scenario S in which a maximal overlapping subset of S has breathing room, conditionalization is diachronically Dutch book-able. To see this, consider the proposition b (for breathing room), defined as follows,
and consider the proposition o (for overlap), defined as follows,
If S * has breathing room, then
. Then, a diachronic Dutch book strategy against the conditionalizer may be constructed as follows. First, prior to their learning which e i ∈ S is true, sell the conditionalizer bets 5 and 6.
, then δ = 0 and bet 6 is guaranteed to pay out $0 no matter what.) If the conditionalizer learns some proposition e j S * , then they will break even on bet 5 and lose $δC(b) on bet 6 (or, in the event that δ = 0, they will break even on both bets). If, however, they learn one of the e * i ∈ S * , then they may be sold bet 7.
This strategy will net the conditionalizer at most
for some e * i ∈ S * , so that δ = 0, then this strategy will net the conditionalizer $0 in some contingencies, and lose them money in others. They will have opened themselves up to the risk of losing money without any possibility of winning money.
for every e * i ∈ S * , then this strategy will lose the conditionalizer money come what may. 18 In conversation, some have wondered whether learning scenarios involving overlap are ones in which any update rule is diachronically Dutch bookable. In fact, there are continuum-many update strategies which are immune to diachronic Dutch book-ability in learning scenarios like these. For the special case in which S = {e 1 , e 2 }, where e 1 and e 2 overlap and their intersection has non-zero credence, any of the strategies for updating your credence that e 1 ∧ e 2 lying on the curve shown in figure 3 are immune from diachronic 18 An agent is also diachronically Dutch book-able if S fails to cover the pre-image of (0, 1] on W-that is, the agent is diachronically Dutch book-able if there is any proposition p to which the agent assigns positive credence such that p ∧ ∨ e∈S e = ∅. Just sell them a dollar bet on p for their credence that p before the learning experience.
Figure 3: None of the update strategies lying on the curve are diachronically Dutch book-ablility in a learning scenario S = {e 1 , e 2 }, where e 1 and e 2 overlap. (This set will not include the conditionalization strategy ⟨C(e 1 | e 2 ), C(e 2 | e 1 )⟩ unless C(e 1 ∧ e 2 ) is either 0 or 1.)
Dutch book-ability. Another particularly interesting example is shown in figure 4 . There, p, e 1 , and e 2 are pairwise independent in the agent's prior credence function C; nevertheless, if that agent decides to revise their views about p in response to learning which of {e 1 , e 2 } is true (by choosing any of the update strategies in the gray area in figure 4), this will not open them up to diachronic Dutch book-ability. (See appendix A for the details.) Hild (1998b) argues that cases like these point to an inconsistency between condi and van Fraassen (1984 Fraassen ( , 1995 's principle of reflection, according to which your credence that p ought to be equal to your expectation of your future credence that p. 19 However, condi and reflection are not actually inconsistent in these learning scenarios-though their combination does have quite counterintuitive results. Imagine that a conditionalizer who obeys reflection finds themselves in the learning scenario shown in figure 2. Suppose that their prior credence that ¬e 2 was 1/3, their prior credence that e 1 ∧ e 2 was 1/3, and their prior credence that ¬e 1 was 1/3. Then, they will reason as follows: whatever I learn, my credence that e 1 ∧ e 2 will rise to 1/2. So, I should have credence 1/2 in e 1 ∧ e 2 now (and credence 1/4 in both ¬e 2 and ¬e 1 ). Let it be so. But now, no matter what I learn, if I conditionalize upon it, then my credence that e 1 ∧ e 2 will rise to 2/3. So I should have credence 2/3 in e 1 ∧ e 2 now (and credence 1/6 in both ¬e 2 and ¬e 1 ). Let it 19 More carefully, if C t is your time t credence function, and C t ′ (p) = x is the proposition that your time t ′ credence that p is x, then the principle of reflection is that, for every t ′ > t, and every proposition p, C t (p | C t ′ (p) = x) ought to be x, and therefore, C t (p) ought to be
Figure 4: In a learning scenario in which the agent will learn either that e 1 or that e 2 , where e 1 and e 2 overlap, none of the update strategies ⟨C 1 (p), C 2 (p)⟩ in the gray area are diachronically Dutch book-able. (To generate the region shown above, I utilized a probability function within which p, e 1 , and e 2 are pairwise independent, C(p) = 1/2, and C(e 1 ) = C(e 2 ) = 2/3.) be so. But now, no matter what I learn, if I conditionalize upon it, then my credence that e 1 ∧ e 2 will rise to 4/5. So I should have credence 4/5 in e 1 ∧ e 2 now (and credence 1/10 in both ¬e 2 and ¬e 1 ). Let it be so. But now. . . . This reasoning iterates indefinitely, for any credence that e 1 ∧ e 2 between 0 and 1, and the only way to abide by both condi and reflection when you learn that you will either learn e 1 or e 2 is to either become absolutely certain of both e 1 and e 2 , or to become absolutely certain that either e 1 or e 2 is false. This strategy will steer you clear of diachronic Dutch book-ability, but it could hardly be counted as epistemically rational. Gallow (2014) argues that learning scenarios like these arise in cases involving theory-dependent evidence. In such cases, you could be in a position in which, if the background theory t is true, then experience will deliver either the evidence e or the evidence ¬e. If, however, the background theory t is false, then experience will not deliver any evidence at all. In these cases, experience will either rationalize absolute certainty that t ⊃ e (and nothing stronger) or it will rationalize absolute certainty that t ⊃ ¬e (and nothing stronger). And these propositions overlap.
However, it appears plausible that there are learning scenarios in which the evidence is (or is at least profitably modeled as) theory-independent, which fail to form a partition. I have just opened my internet browser and learned that Russia has outlawed telling children about homosexuality. In some sense of 'could', I could have learned instead that Russia had outlawed telling anybody about homosexuality. Or I could have learned that Obama was in the hospital recovering from a stroke. Or I could have learned that Michael Vick has once again been arrested for dog fighting. And all of these propositions overlap. Now, I almost certainly learned something stronger than just that Russia has outlawed telling children about homosexuality. For instance, I also learned that the Independent UK reported that Russia outlawed telling children about homosexuality. Below, I'll consider some arguments to the effect that, once you look at the strongest proposition learned, every learning scenario forms a partition. Here, I just want to make it seem plausible that we can learn things in learning scenarios some of whose members overlap. Prima facie, if I learned about Russia's new law in a learning scenario at all, then I learned it in a learning scenario some of whose members overlap. The advocate of the ddba for condi bears the burden of convincing us otherwise.
the ddbas for jcondi
Armendt (1980) presents a ddba for jcondi. He presupposes that the agent finds themselves in a learning scenario in which they could undergo any possible Jeffrey shift on the partition E. That is, given the n-tuple ⟨e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e N ⟩ consisting of the n cells in the partition E, Armendt presupposes that the agent finds themselves in a learning scenario consisting of n-tuples ⟨ε 1 , ε 2 , . . . , ε N ⟩ of posterior credences for ⟨e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e N ⟩ such that
Suppose that an agent conforms to a determinate update rule which tells them to set their posterior credence that p, given e i , C E (p | e i ), to something less than C(p | e i ), for some p ∈ A, some e i ∈ E, and some E ∈ S. Let E < i be the set of Jeffrey shifts for which the agent's rule tells them to set C E (p | e i ) < C(p | e i ). And let e < i be the proposition that the agent undergoes one of the Jeffrey shifts in this set. Armendt makes the assumption that the agent's prior conditional credence in p given e i is independent of the proposition that they've undergone one of the Jeffrey shifts in E < i .
Then, prior to undergoing the learning experience, the agent may be sold bet 8.
If they undergo a Jeffrey shift not in E < , then they will break even on bet 8. If, however, the undergo a Jeffrey shift in E < , then they will purchase bet 9.
If they undergo a Jeffrey shift in E < , then this strategy will lose the agent
; if they undergo another Jeffrey shift, then the strategy will win the agent nothing. So failing to abide by jcondi opens the agent up to the possibility of losing money without any chance of winning money. (A symmetric argument establishes that the agent is diachronically Dutch book-able if they set their posterior credence that p, given e i , C E (p | e i ), to something greater than C(p | e i ), for some p ∈ A, some e i ∈ E, and some E ∈ S.) As Armendt acknowledges, this diachronic Dutch book has the disadvantage of relying upon the agent having credences in propositions about which Jeffrey shift they undergo. Let's call propositions about which learning experience an agent undergoes autoepistemic propositions. 20 If the agent has credences in autoepistemic propositions like these, then we may fairly wonder what need there is for jcondi. Why shouldn't the agent simply conditionalize on the autoepistemic proposition e < i ? This, after all, is the strongest proposition that they learn, and given Armendt's stipulation that
, conditionalizing on this proposition will ensure 20 The terminology comes from Hild (1998b,a) .
Figure 6: The learning scenario presupposed by Skyrms (1987) 's ddba for jcondi. First, the agent will undergo some Jeffrey shift on the partition E = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e N }. Then, they will learn that one member of E is true.
that their credences on the non-autoepistemic propositions will conform to the recommendations of jcondi. However, the whole point of jcondi was supposed to be that it's not always the case that there is a proposition about which experience rationalizes absolute certainty. So there's a very real worry here that all Armendt's diachronic Dutch book establishes is that one should conform to jcondi in a learning scenario in which jcondi is unnecessary, and condi, and the ddba for condi, would have sufficed.
Skyrms (1987) presents a diachronic Dutch book for jcondi which does not rely upon the agent having credences in autoepistemic propositions. However, it does rely upon the agent coming to later learn which of the e i ∈ E is true. The learning scenario he envisages is this: The agent begins with a prior credence function C. Then, they receive some Jeffrey shift, E i , on the partition E (here, as with Armendt's learning scenario, the partition is fixed). They update their credence function to C i . Then, they are told which of the e j ∈ E is true. They update their credence function to C i j . (See figure 6 .) The ddba for condi establishes that if C i j (p) C i (p | e j ), for any p ∈ A and any e j ∈ E, then the agent is diachronically Dutch book-able. So assume that C i j (p) = C i (p | e j ), for every p ∈ A and every e j ∈ E. Now, if there is any potential Jeffrey shift E i , any e j ∈ E, and any p ∈ A such that C i (p | e j ) > C(p | e j ), then the agent may be sold bet 10 prior to undergoing the Jeffrey shift.
if ¬e j If they don't learn that e j , then the agent will break even on bet 10. If, however, they learn that e j , then they may be sold bet 11.
The combination of bets 10 and 11 is guaranteed to lose the agent $C(p | e j ) − C i j (p). (A symmetric argument shows that the agent is diachronically Dutch book-able in this learning scenario if they adopt a strategy where
for any p ∈ A, any Jeffrey shift E i , and any e j ∈ E.) Skyrms (1987) also shows the converse: that jcondi is not diachronically Dutch book-able in this two-stage learning scenario. Skyrms's ddba for jcondi proceeds as follows:
7. Any determinate rule for updating your degrees of belief in response to Jeffrey shifts other than jcondi is diachronically Dutch book-able in a learning scenario consisting of Jeffrey shifts all on the same partition followed by a learning experience in which the agent learns which cell of the partition is true.
8. Updating your degrees of belief with jcondi is not diachronically Dutch book-able in a this learning scenario.
9. Ideally epistemically rational agents update their degrees of beliefs in response to Jeffrey shifts in accordance with determinate update rules.
10. Ideally epistemically rational agents are not diachronically Dutch bookable.
11. So, ideally epistemically rational agents always update their degrees of beliefs in response to Jeffrey shifts with jcondi.
However, as with the ddba for condi, without extra premises, this argument is invalid. Here, we would not only need an extra premise to the effect that every Jeffrey shift is acquired in a learning scenario consisting of Jeffrey shifts all on the same partition. We would also need the extra premise that, if an update rule is diachronically Dutch book-able in this two-stage learning scenario, then an ideally rational agent would not utilize that update rule when they were undergoing only the first stage of that learning scenario.
the ddba against jcondi
In contrast to the complicated appeals to autoepistemic propositions and two-stage learning scenarios in the ddbas for jcondi, we can quite effortlessly provide a ddba against jcondi by simply looking to a learning scenario in which the agent will undergo a Jeffrey shift on one of two cross-cutting partitions. For instance, suppose that an agent will either undergo a Jeffrey shift raising their credence that e 1 or a Jeffrey shift raising their credence that e 2 , where e 1 and e 2 overlap. 21 In that case, if the agent conforms to jcondi, then their credence that e 1 ∧ e 2 will go up no matter which Jeffrey shift they undergo. Then, the Jeffrey conditionalizer may be sold bet 12 prior to undergoing the learning experience.
Bet 12
And, after they undergo a Jeffrey shift raising their credence that e i , they may be sold bet 13.
The combination of bets 12 and 13 will lose the Jeffrey conditionalizer $C(e 1 ∧ e 2 ) − C i (e 1 ∧ e 2 ) come what may. So jcondi is diachronicaly Dutch bookable in this learning scenario. 22
3 Diachronic Dutch Books and Evidential Import
In this section, I'm going to suggest that there's a tension between a norm of rationality which advises us to avoid diachronic Dutch books and a norm of rationality, like condi or jcondi, according to which the rational response to 21 When I say that the agent will undergo a Jeffrey shift 'raising their credence that e i ', I mean that the shift will be representable with {⟨e i , ε i ⟩, ⟨¬e i , 1 − ε i ⟩}, with ε i > C(e i ). 22 A generalization of this Dutch book strategy precisely analogous to the one provided in §2.2 above is available, but in the interest of space, I won't provide it here. a learning experience is determined entirely by your prior credal state and the evidence acquired in the learning experience. I will suggest that this tension shows us that ddbas cannot be used to argue for update rules like condi and jcondi, since if you accept these update rules, then you must reject one of the argument's premises-viz., the premise that ideally epistemically rational agents are not diachronically Dutch book-able.
the problem for the ddba for condi
Suppose that you are a participant in a psychologist's experiment. You are waiting in line to go into a room that contains a certain object which is either spherical or cubical, and is either green or blue; it is not, however, you have been assured, both blue and cubical. The room will either be pitch black, and you will be allowed to feel the object to ascertain its shape, or the room will be well lit, and you will be able to ascertain its color, though not enough of the object will be exposed for you to ascertain its shape. So you will either learn something about the object's shape, or something about its color, but not both. Every participant in the experiment will learn precisely the same thing when they enter the room. You are told, and are absolutely certain of, all of this ahead of time. Before you enter the room, a close friend of yours who you are absolutely confident is speaking truthfully says one of the following three sentences to you:
α) You will either learn that it is green or that it is blue β) You will either learn that it is green or that it is spherical γ) You will either learn that it is cubical or that it is spherical.
Call the version of you that hears sentence α 'A', call the version of you that hears sentence β 'B', and call the version of you that hears sentence γ 'Γ'. Suppose further, just to cancel any implicatures that α, β, or γ might carry, that your friend is in the habit of uttering true disjunctions of this form, even when they know which of the disjuncts is true, that there's no interesting correlation between the order the disjuncts come in and which is known, and so on and so forth. That is to say: the only relevant information that your friend's utterance of α, β, or γ carries is that those disjunctions are true. Suppose that your only relevant credal opinions are in the propositions that the object is green (g), that it is blue (b), that it is spherical (s), and that it is cubical (c)-though I will revisit this assumption later on. Since you are certain that it is not the case that the object is both cubical and blue, {g ∧ c, g ∧ s, b ∧ s} partitions your credal state. The information that your friend gives you, in α, β, or γ, rules out none of the cells of this partition. Might it nevertheless call for a change in the credences that you assign to any cell of this partition? Perhaps, but if so, it would have to call for a Jeffrey shift, since it wouldn't license absolute certainty about any propositions concerning the object's color or shape, and these are-we're stipulating, for now-the only relevant propositions about which you hold any credal opinions.
Since A is certain that they will either learn that g or they will learn that b, their learning scenario is S A = {g, b}. Since B is certain that they will either learn that g or they will learn that s, their learning scenario is S B = {g, s}. Since Γ is certain that they will either learn that c or they will learn that s, their learning scenario is S Γ = {c, s}. These learning scenarios are shown in figure 7. This case brings out a tension between the following two theses.
Rational Updating is Determined by Priors and Evidence (PE). The rational way to update your credence function when you acquire evidence is entirely determined by your prior credence function and the evidence that you acquire.

Rational Updating is not Diachronically Dutch Book-able (DB). If you rationally update your prior credence function on the acquired evidence, then you will not be diachronically Dutch book-able.
The tension is that, if triads of learning scenarios like A's, B's and Γ's are possible, then PE and DB are inconsistent. Suppose, for reductio, that learning scenarios like these are possible and that both PE and DB are true. Then, suppose that both A and B learn that g. By stipulation, A and B have the same priors. Thus, rationality should demand the same response of both of them, by PE. Suppose, on the other hand, that both B and Γ learn that s. By stipulation, B and Γ have the same priors. Thus, rationality should demand the same response of both of them, by PE. However, rationality demands that A conditionalize on g if they learn it, by DB; and rationality demands that Γ conditionalize on s if they learn it, by DB. Thus, rationality demands both that B conditionalize on g if they learn it, and that B conditionalize on s if they learn it. But if B does that, then they are diachronically Dutch book-able. So rationality can't demand it of them, by DB. Contradiction.
Condi, as it is usually understood, presupposes PE. The ddba for condi presupposes DB-it is just premise 4 of the argument outlined in §2.1. So, if triads of learning scenarios like A's, B's, and Γ's are possible, then if you accept the conclusion of the ddba for condi, then you must reject premise 4 of that argument. So the ddba for condi is invalid, if traids of learning scenarios like A's, B's, and Γ's are possible.
Above, I made the assumption that, when the only relevant propositions about which you hold credal opinions are g, b, s, and c, and you are already certain that ¬(b ∧ c), your credences in {g ∧ c, g ∧ s, b ∧ s} should not change upon hearing α, β, or γ. However, we can now see that this assumption is not necessary for generating the contradiction between PE and DB. Rather, the only assumption we need is that there is a triple ⟨C A , C B , C Γ ⟩ of prior credal states such that C A,α = C B, β = C Γ,γ -where 'C A,α ' is a rational credence function to adopt upon hearing α, given that one started with the credence function C A , C B, β is a rational credence function to adopt upon hearing β, given that one started with the credence function C B , and C Γ,γ is a rational credence function to adopt upon hearing γ, given that one started with the credence function C Γ . Suppose that we think that the correct response to hearing α, β, or γ is a Jeffrey shift, and suppose that we think, with Field (1978) , that the correct way to represent the input of a Jeffrey shift is with a tuple of input parameters ⟨θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ N ⟩, which, together with our prior credences in ⟨e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e N ⟩, determine the weightings ⟨ε 1 , ε 2 , . . . , ε N ⟩ presupposed by Jeffrey's update rule. 23 Then, no matter which input parameters ⟨θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ⟩ on the partition {g ∧ c, g ∧ s, b ∧ s} we think hearing α, β, or γ calls for, there will be some triple of prior credal states ⟨C A , C B , C Γ ⟩ such that, by updating on those input parameters, we can get
23 For Field, the weightings are determined by the input parameters according to the equation
We thus face three options: firstly, we could either emend our understanding of condi, insisting that it only applies in learning scenarios which form a partition-thus abandoning PE. This position is explicitly endorsed by Pearl (1988) , Hild (1998b,a) , and Bronfman (forthcoming). Secondly, we could reject the claim that rational updating is not diachronically Dutch book-able, DB. This position is explicitly endorsed by van Fraassen (1984) and Christensen (1991) . Thirdly, we could deny that triads of learning scenarios like A's, B's, and Γ's are possible. I expect this third option to be the most popular; and I will spend the rest of this section considering it. My conclusion at the end of §3.1 will be that, if triads of learning scenarios like these are not possible, then it is possible to acquire evidence outside of any learning scenario. As noted in §2.1, if it is possible to acquire evidence outside of any learning scenario, then the ddba for condi is invalid.
If we are to deny that triads of learning scenarios like those shown in figure 7 are possible, we could do so on at least one of two grounds: firstly, we could say that the nature of evidence guarantees that learning scenarios form a partition. Secondly, we could say that it is in the nature of a learning scenario that it must form a partition. A good example of the first kind of response comes from Lewis (1999) , who appears to implicitly defend the assumption that a learning scenario will always form a partition when he describes the propositions that you might learn in any learning experience as being "mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive propositions that specify, in full detail, all the alternative courses of experience you might undergo". 24 If the evidence you acquire consists of a proposition specifying in full detail the course of experience you have undergone (along with something like a that's all clause-more on that in a bit), then the potential evidence will form a partition. Nevertheless, the assumption that your evidence consists of a proposition specifying in full detail the course of experience you have undergone is rather implausible. You look up at the night sky. Perhaps you learn that Orion is visible; perhaps you learn that the big dipper is not. But, prima facie, you do not learn exactly how many stars are in your visual field; nor do you learn the ratio of the distance between Orion's hands and the distance between his feet. 25 Even Lewis's incredibly rich conception of evidence fails to guarantee that the potential evidence forms a partition without the additional assumption that the evidence includes something like a that's all proviso to the effect that the experience does not consist of anything other than the features specified by the evidence. For instance, a hearing impaired person could have a visual, tactile, gustatory, etc. experience visually, tactily, gustatorily, etc. identical to one accompanied with an auditory experience. Without a that's all clause, the propositions describing these two experiences will overlap. More generally, there's a difference between saying that e is your total evidence and saying that your evidence includes the proposition that e is your total evidence. Use ⌜ Lϕ ⌝ to stand for the proposition that you have learned that ϕ; and use ⌜ Eϕ ⌝ to stand for the proposition that ϕ is your total evidence (that is, that you have learned that ϕ and that anything else that you have learned is entailed by ϕ). On the assumption that evidence is factive, Ee | = e. If, additionally, your total evidence, e, includes that e is your total evidence, then e | = Ee. 26 Then, e and Ee must be equivalent, e ≡ Ee-that is, they must pick out the very same set of worlds in W. This means that you do not recognize any possibilities in which e is true without your total evidence being that e. This guarantees that the potential total evidence propositions are mutually exclusive and that the learning operator L satisfies both 'positive introspection', Lϕ → LLϕ, and 'negative introspection', ¬Lϕ → L¬Lϕ. 27, 28 Some may want to contend-though I suspect, due to his 1996, that Lewis would not want to contend-that the model of learning that Lewis (1999) presupposes, in which our evidence consists of a proposition specifying in full detail the course of experience we have undergone, is merely an idealization. True, agents like us don't gain the evidence that there are 1,157 stars in our visual field; but a suitably idealized agent would gain this evidence. I certainly believe that idealizations can prove epistemologically interesting and theoretically fruitful-I wouldn't be doing formal epistemology 26 Note: throughout, I'm using '| =' to stand for the subset relation, '⊆'. That is, if A and B are sets of worlds in W, then A | = B iff A ⊆ B. Under the assumption of logical omniscience, the relations of logical consequence and subset will line up perfectly; if, however, the agent takes some logical falsehoods to be possible, then the two will come apart. 27 Proof sketch: Since, for every potential bit of total evidence e, Ee ≡ e, no two distinct pieces of potential evidence, e and e ′ , can overlap, else it would be possible that both Ee and Ee ′ , which is a contradiction, by the definition of 'total evidence'. So potential evidence propositions are mutually exclusive. By definition, Lϕ holds only iff Ee and e | = ϕ for some e. Thus, for any e such that e ≡ Ee, if e | = ϕ, then e | = Lϕ. So Lϕ → LLϕ is valid. By definition, ¬Lϕ holds iff Ee and e ̸ | = ϕ. Thus, for any e ≡ Ee such that e ̸ | = ϕ, e | = ¬Lϕ. For if e ̸ | = ¬Lϕ, then there would be some world in e at which Lϕ. Yet this is impossible, since e is one's total evidence, and e ̸ | = ϕ. Thus, for any ϕ, if e ≡ Ee and e ̸ | = ϕ, then e | = ¬Lϕ. By the definition of 'L', then, L¬Lϕ. Thus, ¬Lϕ → L¬Lϕ is valid. 28 In an epistemic logic with the standard Kripke semantics, the assumption that the accessibility relation is an equivalence (reflexive, symmetric, and transitive) relation guarantees that both positive and negative introspection are valid. See, e.g., Fagin et al. (1995, theorem 2.4 
.1).
if I didn't-but once we start making idealizations about the kind of evidence that agents acquire, it's no longer clear that this idealization has any interesting connection to the epistemic rationality of agents like us. Why should we use the doxastic state of an agent with more evidence to evaluate the epistemic rationality of the doxastic state of an agent with less evidence? Simply because your degrees of belief are not those of an agent who has more evidence than you do, this doesn't mean that you have fallen short of ideal epistemic rationality, any more than the fact that your degrees of belief aren't those of an omniscient agent means that you have fallen short of ideal epistemic rationality. A forteriori, having the same degrees of belief as an agent with more evidence than you is frequently epistemically irrational; if you were to become absolutely certain that the number of stars in your visual field is 1,157 when you haven't counted them all up, you would be epistemically irrational, even if you happened to hit upon the correct number. Now, we might think that ideal epistemic rationality requires acquiring all the evidence that is, in some sense, available to us. And, when we look at the night sky, the evidence of how many stars are in our visual field is-in some sense-available to us. Even so, this doesn't mean that, if we fail to acquire all the evidence that is available to us, we should act as though we have. Nor does it mean that, if we are absolutely certain that we will not acquire all the evidence that is in some sense available to us, we should plan to revise our degrees of belief as though we were going to acquire all of that evidence. Suppose that a man has an envelope in front of him which he knows either contains evidence that his wife has been faithful or evidence that she has cheated on him. Suppose that the man, because he has faith in his wife, resolves to not open the envelope. 29 Perhaps failing to look in the envelope constitutes a failure of epistemic rationality. However, what is certainly not a failure of rationality is failing to either become more confident that his wife has been faithful or to become more confident that his wife has cheated. Even if there's some epistemic irrationality going on here, the irrationality has to do with the failure to collect available evidence; it has nothing to do with the way that the man's credences evolve over time, given the evidence he has collected. Similarly, even if there's some irrationality involved in failing to acquire the evidence that there are 1,157 stars in your visual field, the irrationality has nothing to do with the way that your credences evolve over time. And a full theory of diachronic rationality-even ideal diachronic rationality-ought to tell us something about what to do when we will fail to acquire all the evidence that we have (in some sense) at our disposal, and we know ahead of time that we will fail to acquire all of this evidence. Even if the man falls short of ideal epistemic rationality by failing to look in the envelope, we can still ask what the epistemically ideal response to his (not ideally rationally collected) evidence is. Similarly, we can ask what the epistemically ideal response to a body of evidence lacking the information of how many stars are in your visual field is, even if any such body of evidence must have been not ideally rationally collected.
So I don't think that, in general, claims about the nature of evidence are going to do much to help reach the conclusion that learning scenarios always form a partition. Even if there's some reason to think that the potential available evidence forms a partition, an agent could know full well that they will fail to acquire all of the available evidence. So I'll move on to arguments alleging that the very nature of a learning scenario guarantees that a learning scenario will form a partition.
There is a rather glib strategy for arguing that every learning scenario must form a partition: we could simply make it a matter of definition. We could say: "by 'learning scenario' I shall mean any situation in which an agent stands to learn that one of a partition of propositions is true". This would immediately rule out any triad of learning scenarios like those shown in figure 7. As with most attempts to marshall stipulative definitions to justify a contested claim, this move simply pushes the debate elsewhere: why should we think that vulnerability to a Dutch betting strategy is only objectionable in situations which count as 'learning scenarios' in this stipulatively-defined sense? Of course, an answer to this question would, all by itself, provide a reason to rule out triads of learning scenarios like those shown in figure 7 . The appeal to stipulative definitions is an idle dialectical wheel.
Here's a more promising suggestion: in order to be in a learning scenario S = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e N }, it must be epistemically possible that your total evidence will be any of the e i ∈ S and it must be epistemically necessary that at least one e i ∈ S will be your total evidence. The claim that it is epistemically possible that any e i ∈ S be your total evidence and epistemically necessary that at least one e i ∈ S is your total evidence just amounts to the claim that {Ee 1 , Ee 2 , . . . , Ee N } forms a partition (where, recall, ⌜ Eϕ ⌝ is the proposition that ϕ is your total evidence). Assume additionally that, if you acquire the total evidence e, then you also acquire the evidence that e is your total evidence. Given that evidence is factive, Ee | = e, so when e is your total evidence, Ee must be the strongest proposition that you learn (and equivalent to e). Thus, for every e i ∈ S, e i ≡ Ee i , and the claim that {Ee 1 , Ee 2 , . . . , Ee N } forms a partition is just the claim that {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e N } forms a partition. So, every learning scenario must form a partition. 30 Applying this suggestion to the case of A, B, and Γ above: suppose that, prior to hearing either α, β, or γ, you hold credal opinions about the propositions Lg, Lb, Lc, and Ls (where, recall, ⌜ Lϕ ⌝ is the proposition that you have learned that ϕ). Upon hearing α, A eliminates the possibilities Lc and Ls. Upon hearing β, B eliminates the possibilities Lc and Lb. And upon hearing γ, Γ eliminates the possibilities Lg and Lb. They thus end up with the credal states in the middle of figure 8. Suppose that, if B learns that g, then they also learn that Lg; and if they learn that s, then they also learn that Ls. Thus, B's total evidence will either be Lg or Ls. But {Lg, Ls} partitions B's prior credal state, so DB mandates that they update by conditionalizing on their evidence, and the tension between PE and DB is alleviated.
Because this argument appeals to what I called in §2.3 autoepistemic propositions-propositions about what one has learned, or what one's total evidence is-I will refer to it as the autoepistemic argument. I have two worries about the autoepistemic argument. Firstly, accepting this argument commits us to the claim that, for every e ∈ S, Ee ≡ e. As we saw back on page 23, this entails both 'postitive introspection', Lϕ → LLϕ, and 'negative introspection', ¬Lϕ → L¬Lϕ. On the picture presupposed by condi, what it is for you to learn that ϕ is for your experience to make it rational to raise your credence that ϕ to 1 and regard possibilities in which ¬ϕ as epistemically impossible-i.e., it is for your experience to rationalize absolute certainty that ϕ. If an experience can rationalize absolute certainty that ϕ without rationalizing absolute certainty that it has rationalized absolute certainty that ϕ-or if it can fail to rationalize absolute certainty that ϕ without rationalizing absolute certainty that it has failed to rationalize absolute certainty that ϕ-then say that there has been an introspective failure. If we think that introspective failures are consistent with ideal rationality, then we must reject the autoepistemic argument.
There are reasons, familiar from the work of Williamson, for thinking introspective failures are consistent with ideal rationality. To co-opt an argument from Williamson (forthcoming), suppose that you catch a glimpse of a stopped clock. The second hand is some number of degrees, θ, from 12 o'clock (moving clockwise). You are far enough away that, if θ = x, then your glimpse does not rationalize absolute certainty that θ = x. However, if θ = x, then your glimpse will rationalize absolute certainty that θ is within ϵ degrees of x, for some ϵ. For instance, if θ = 45, then you may be rationally certain that the second hand is on the right-hand-side of the clock face. Suppose, moreover, that you are rationally certain that, if θ = x, then your glimpse rationalizes at most absolute certainty that θ ∈ [x − ϵ, x + δ], for some δ, ϵ. Moreover, you are rationally certain, by the symmetry of the case, that if
contradicting our assumption that you could not be rationally absolutely certain that θ = x. So it cannot be that EE(θ ∈ [x − ϵ, x + ϵ]), for any ϵ, even though it must be that E(θ ∈ [x − ϵ, x + ϵ]), for some ϵ. 31 Thus,
Secondly, even if the autoepistemic argument is able to establish that every learning scenario partitions the agent's credal state, it is only able to do so by making it rather plausible that not all evidence is acquired in some 31 Or perhaps that E(θ ∈ (x − ϵ, x + ϵ)), for some ϵ.
learning scenario or other. The autoepistemic argument concludes that, in order to be in a learning scenario S = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e N }, each e i ∈ S must be such that Ee i ≡ e i -i.e., you recognize no possibilities in which your total evidence is true without it being the case that you acquire that total evidence. If we think that it's possible to acquire evidence without this condition being met, then we will think that it's possible to acquire evidence outside of any learning scenario, even if we're persuaded that all learning scenarios form a partition of the agent's credal state. And, if it's possible to acquire evidence outside of any learning scenario, then the ddba for condi fails to establish that you ought to update by conditionalization in those cases. So the ddba for condi is invalid.
For an illustration of this problem, look back to the autoepistemic argument that B's learning scenario must form a partition, illustrated in figure 8. This argument was able to establish that B's learning scenario formed a partition only by conceding that the respective certainties rationalized by hearing α, β, and γ overlap. Look to the set of total evidence propositions which were supposed to be responsible for getting A, B, and Γ into their partitioned learning scenarios in the first place, viz., {Lg ∨ Lb, Lg ∨ Ls, Ls ∨ Lc}. The autoepistemic response to the case of A, B, and Γ relied upon it being possible for you to learn any of the members of this set. Either this set, or some superset of this set, could constitute a learning scenario or it could not. If it could constitute a learning scenario, then it is possible to have learning scenarios which don't form a partition. If it coudn't, then the autoepistemic response commits us to saying that it's possible to acquire evidence outside of any learning scenario. Either way, the response commits us to saying that the ddba for condi is invalid.
the problem for the ddbas for jcondi
Suppose that you're in the same experiment described at the start of §3.1, with two minor variations. If the room is pitch black, then a guide will take your hand and brush it quickly against the object. This quick tactile sensation will either rationalize raising your credence that the object is cubical or it will rationalize raising your credence that the object is spherical-but it will not rationalize raising either of those credences all the way to 1. If the room is illuminated, on the other hand, then the lighting will be very dim, and you will only be allowed a quick glimpse of the object. This glimpse will either rationalize raising your credence that the object is green or it will rationalize raising your credence that the object is blue-but it won't rationalize raising either of those credences all the way to 1. Additionally, at the conclusion of the experiment, once everyone has been in the room, you will be told the object's shape and color. (This experiment is, therefore, analogous to Skyrms's two-stage learning scenario.)
Once again, your friend is ahead of you in line; and after they leave the room, they say one of the following sentences to you: α * ) You'll either end up more confident that it's green or that it's blue. β * ) You'll either end up more confident that it's green or that it's spherical. γ * ) You'll either end up more confident that it's cubical or that it's spherical.
Call the version of you that hears α * 'A * '; call the version of you that hears β * 'B * '; and call the version of you that hears γ * 'Γ * '. A * 's learning scenario consists of a Jeffrey shift raising their credence that g and a Jeffrey shift raising their credence that b. B * 's learning scenario consists of a Jeffrey shift raising their credence that g and a Jeffrey shift raising their credence that s. Γ * 's learning scenario consists of a Jeffrey shift raising their credence that c and a Jeffrey shift raising their credence that s.
As we saw in §2.3, A * is diachronically Dutch book-able if they fail to update by Jeffrey conditionalization in response to a Jeffrey shift raising their credence that g; and Γ * is diachronically Dutch book-able if they fail to update by Jeffrey conditionalization in response to a Jeffrey shift raising their credence that s. However, as we saw in §2.4, B * is diachronically Dutch bookable if they update by Jeffrey conditionalization both in response to a Jeffrey shift raising their credence that g and in response to a Jeffrey shift raising their credence that s.
Thus, if triads of learning scenarios like A * 's, B * 's, and Γ * 's are possible, then PE and DB are inconsistent, just as above (the argument is precisely the same, with 'A * ' swapped out for 'A', 'B * ' swapped out for 'B', and 'Γ * ' swapped out for 'Γ'). The ddbas for condi and jcondi employ DB as a premise, and both condi and jcondi, as they are usually understood, entail PE. So, both the ddba for condi and the ddba for jcondi are invalid. Note that this argument against the ddba for condi doesn't depend at all upon the question of whether learning scenarios consisting of propositional evidence form a partition. So long as one claims that there can be triads of learning scenarios like A * 's, B * 's, and Γ * 's, then PE and DB will be inconsistent, and the ddba for condi will be invalid.
Moreover, here we cannot appeal to propositions about our own experience, or autoepistemic propositions like 'I underwent the Jeffrey shift E' as we did in the case of condi. For if there are propositions like these in A for the agent to conditionalize upon, then, as we saw in the discussion of Armendt's ddba for jcondi, there would be no need for jcondi in the first place. If there is a proposition specifying their course of experience in full detail, or saying that there total evidence is the Jeffrey shift E, then the agent may (indeed, must) simply conditionalize upon this proposition, and there is no need for jcondi. Jcondi was motivated by precisely the thought that, in scenarios like A * 's, B * 's, and Γ * 's, there is no proposition for them to conditionalize upon. To deny this is to deny jcondi's raison d'être.
two theories of evidential import
Stepping back from the argument that PE and DB are inconsistent, I believe we can diagnose what's going on here at a more general level by noting that, if non-partitioning learning scenarios are possible, then a ddba and an update rule like condi entail incompatible claims about evidential importincompatible claims about what determines the rational response to a piece of total evidence. Because it requires a specification of the agent's learning scenario, and because, as we saw in §2.2, its verdicts are sensitive to whether this learning scenario forms a partition, if non-partitioning learning scenarios are possible, then a ddba-any ddba-entails a contrastivist thesis about evidential import.
Constrastive Evidential Import (CEI).
The rational response to acquiring the total evidence e depends upon which other pieces of total evidence could have been acquired instead.
Condi and jcondi, on the other hand, because they do not require a specification of which other propositions the agent might have acquired instead, entail a nonconstrastivist thesis about evidential import.
Nonconstrastive Evidential Import (NEI).
The rational response to acquiring the total evidence e does not depend upon which other pieces of total evidence could have been acquired instead. different learning scenarios, S 1 and S 2 , containing the very same evidence, such that a response to that evidence which is not diachronically Dutch bookable in S 1 is diachronically Dutch book-able in S 2 , then accepting that ddba means accepting NEI, which means rejecting rules like condi and jcondi, which are inconsistent with NEI.
Conclusion
The problem for the ddbas for jcondi ( §3.2) leaves very little wiggle room. As I see things, accepting those arguments means rejecting NEI, and therefore, rejecting both condi and jcondi, as those rules are usually understood.
With respect to the problem for the ddba for condi ( §3.1), there is more wiggle room. How devastating the problem is depends in part upon whether we are persuaded that non-partitioning learning scenarios are possible. If not-if we end up thinking that every learning scenario must partition Wthen we might want to hold on to the ddba for condi but exchange its conclusion (5) 5. Ideally epistemically rational agents always update their degrees of beliefs in accordance with condi in response to propositional evidence.
for a weakened conclusion along the lines of (12) 12. In learning scenarios, ideally epistemically rational agents update their degrees of beliefs in accordance with condi in response to propositional evidence.
and concede that, while the ddba shows that you should conditionalize in learning scenarios, it doesn't show that you ought to conditionalize when you acquire evidence outside of a learning scenario. Taking this tack does require finding some response to the Williamsonian arguments rehearsed on page 27, but perhaps some compelling response is in the offing. If we don't think that non-partitioning learning scenarios are possible, then we would be free to appeal to other arguments that we ought to conform to condi (and jcondi) when we acquire evidence outside of a learning scenario. Such arguments are available. There is an argument from symmetry, 32 from calibration, 33 from suppositional consistency, 34 and a handful of arguments that attempt to justify condi and jcondi on the grounds that 32 See van Fraassen (1989, ch. 13) 33 See Lange (1999) 34 See Titelbaum (2013, ch. 7) conforming to those rules will minimize the expected inaccuracy of your posterior credences. 35 With the exception of Greaves & Wallace (2006) 's and Easwaran (2013) 's expected inaccuracy minimization arguments for condi, none of these justificatory strategies require any specification of the agent's learning scenario. Thus, if we think that all learning scenarios form a partition, then, while we're not forced to abandon the ddba for condi, we will end up thinking that they are (far?) less general than many other arguments for that update rule.
Suppose, on the other hand, that we think that non-partitioning learning scenarios are possible. Then, we face a choice. We could either endorse CEI or NEI. If we take the first choice, then we'll think that the ddba still shows that ideally rational agents update in accordance with condi whenever they acquire propositional evidence in a learning scenario which forms a partition, but we would have to swap out the ddba's conclusion (5) for a conclusion along the lines of (6).
6. In learning scenarios which form a partition, ideally epistemically rational agents update their degrees of beliefs in accordance with condi in response to propositional evidence.
This saves the ddba, but at the expense of revising condi. That belief-revision rule, recall, said that whenever experience rationalizes absolute certainty that e, and nothing stronger, you should adopt a posterior credence function
condi. If you become rationally certain that e, and nothing stronger,
There is no mention of a contrast class of other potential evidence propositions. If we were to opt for this first route, then we would have to exchange condi for a more qualified belief revision norm like condi * . condi * . If you become rationally certain that e, rather than e ′ , e ′′ , . . . , disjoint from e, and nothing stronger,
And, presumably, we would want to generalize this rule to cover cases where the contrast class of evidence propositions fail to be disjoint from e. 36 Rejecting NEI in favor of CEI means revising several other orthodox Bayesian positions as well. For instance, in the philosophy of statistics, Bayesians like Howson & Urbach (2005) have objected to the Frequentist demand that statisticians use 'stopping rules'-rules specifying under what conditions they will stop collecting evidence. The Bayesians object to stopping rules by pointing to the absurdity of the idea that the evidential import of some data set depends upon some aspect of the researcher's mental state-the point at which they had planned to stop collecting data. But notice that, if we take stopping rules to generate learning scenarios by generating the possible data sets the researcher might receive, then some stopping rules will result in learning scenarios which fail to form a partition. Imagine that I'm going to flip a coin to estimate its bias. I flip it four times and get the sequence HTHH. I could have used the stopping rule stop after four flips. Then, the potential data sets will form a partition. Alternatively, I could have used the stopping rule stop after thiry seconds. In that case, my data could have been the sequence HTHHT (if I had flipped a bit faster), and this sequence overlaps with the sequence I actually got. If we revise condi in the way suggested, then we will think that the evidential import of the sequence HTHH depends upon which stopping rule we used, and this amounts to revising the orthodox Bayesian line on stopping rules.
Alternatively, we could accept that non-partitioning learning scenarios are possible and yet stick to the unqualified version of condi. This is tantamount to rejecting CEI in favor of NEI. If we take this tack, then we must reject premise 4 of the ddba for condi. This doesn't mean forsaking condi. As I noted above, there are other arguments for that belief-revision rule which don't involve specifying which other evidence an agent might have acquired instead, and are thus consistent with NEI. However, it does mean forsaking the ddba for condi, as well as ddbas for any other putative principle of rationality-like, for instance, the ddba for reflection.
A Diachronic Dutch Book-ability in Non-partitioning Learning Scenarios
Given a probability space ⟨W, A, C, C⟩, we may, utilizing the technique of Diaconis & Zabell (1982, theorem 2.1, p. 824) , construct a new probability space ⟨W * , A * , C * , C * ⟩, such that a) W * = (W − e 1 ∩ e 2 ) ∪ (e 2 ∩ e 2 × {1, 2}); b) for every p ∈ A, C, there is a p * ∈ A * , C * such that p * def = (p ∩ ¬e 1 ) ∪ (p ∩ ¬e 2 ) ∪ (p ∩ e 2 ∩ e 2 ) * , and (p ∩ e 2 ∩ e 2 ) * def = ⟨p ∩ e 2 ∩ e 2 , 1⟩ ∪ ⟨p ∩ e 2 ∩ e 2 , 2⟩; and c) for each p * ∈ A * , C * , C * (p * ) = C(p).
That is to say, we may enrich the algebra of the probability space to in-clude two new propositions x 1 , x 2 ⊆ e 2 ∩ e 2 , where x 1 def = ∪ w∈e 1 ∩e 2 ⟨w, 1⟩, and x 2 def = ∪ w∈e 1 ∩e 2 ⟨w, 2⟩. (Note that ⟨W * , A * , C * , C * ⟩ will not be uniquethere will be several ways of enriching the algebra in this manner.)
Suppose that an agent A * with a credal state ⟨W * , A * , C * , C * ⟩ will either learn that ¬e 2 ∨ x 1 or that ¬e 1 ∨ x 2 . Then, conditionalization is the strategy ⟨C 1 (p), C 2 (p)⟩, where
By the construction of C * , C * (p ∧ ¬e 2 ) = C(p ∧ ¬e 2 ), C * (¬e 2 ) = C(¬e 2 ), C * (p ∧ e 2 ) = C(p ∧ e 2 ), and C * (e 2 ) = C(e 2 ). However, the construction of C * does not fix the values of C * (p ∧ x 1 ) and C * (x 1 ) beyond the constraints that
C(x 1 ) − C(p ∧ x 1 ) ≤ C(e 1 ∧ e 2 ) − C(p ∧ e 1 ∧ e 2 )
Thus, for every ⟨x, y⟩ within the parallelogram with vertices ⟨0, 0⟩, ⟨C(p ∧ e 1 ∧ e 2 ), C(p ∧ e 1 ∧ e 2 )⟩, ⟨C(e 1 ∧ e 2 ), C(p ∧ e 1 ∧ e 2 )⟩, ⟨C(e 1 ∧ e 2 ) − C(p ∧ e 1 ∧ e 2 ), 0⟩
there is a credal state ⟨W * , A * , C * ⟩ such that ⟨C * (x 1 ), C * (p ∧ x 1 )⟩ = ⟨x, y⟩. (See figure 9. ) Call the set of points ⟨C * (x 1 ), C * (p ∧ x 1 )⟩ contained within this parallelogram 'S C p '. Then, the set of conditionalization strategies ⟨C 1 (p), C 2 (p)⟩ for credal states ⟨W * , A * , C * ⟩ constructible as specified above is found by taking the points inside Since {¬e 2 ∨ x 1 , ¬e 1 ∨ x 2 } partitions W * , given any credal state ⟨W * , A * , C * , C * ⟩, the agent, A * , with that credal state will not be diachronically Dutch book-able if they adopt the strategy of conditionalization (by Skyrms, 1987, theorem 5, p. 16) . A conditionalizer, A * , with a credal state ⟨W * , A * , C * , C * ⟩ constructed as defined above will take all the same bets on the propositions in the algebra A as an agent, A, with the credal state ⟨W, A, C, C⟩. So, if there is some conditionalizer A * whose update strategy agrees with A's on the propositions in A, then A is not diachronically Dutch book-able.
In the special case in which p = e 1 ∧ e 2 , the set of non-diachronically Dutch book-able update strategies ⟨C 1 (e 1 ∧ e 2 ), C 2 (e 1 ∧ e 2 )⟩ is given by C 1 (e 1 ∧ e 2 ) = C * (x 1 ) C(¬e 2 ) + C * (x 1 ) C 2 (e 1 ∧ e 2 ) = C(e 1 ∧ e 2 ) − C * (x 1 ) C(e 2 ) − C * (x 1 )
where C * (x 1 ) can take on any value between 0 and C(e 1 ∧ e 2 ). So long as 0 < C(e 1 ∧ e 2 ) < 1, the set of non Dutch book-able strategies ⟨C 1 (e 1 ∧ e 2 ), C 2 (e 1 ∧ e 2 )⟩ will lie on a curve with endpoints ⟨0, C(e 1 | e 2 )⟩ and ⟨C(e 2 | e 1 ), 0⟩, as shown in figure 3. The set S C p under the transformation T C p is shown in the grey region. The update strategies ⟨C 1 (p), C 2 (p)⟩ within T C p (S C p ) are immune from diachronic Dutch book-ability in a learning scenario {e 1 , e 2 }. (This particular region was obtained from the prior distribution C(¬e 2 ) = C(e 1 ∧ e 2 ) = C(¬e 1 ) = 1/3, C(p ∧ ¬e 2 ) = 1/12, C(p ∧ e 1 ∧ e 2 ) = 1/6, and C(p ∧ ¬e 1 ) = 1/4.)
